Introduction
Theq uestion of representation plays ap rominent role not only in recent discussions focusing on the possibilities of political agency but also in the more generaldebates on the future of liberal democracyassuch. In view of ever more trans-and supranational cooperations and parastatal entities that are neither democratically legitimized nor to be held accountable by traditionalp olitical procedures,r epresentation as af undamental principle of liberal democracies appears to lose its significance. Indeed,weseem to experience aseverecrisis of representation. From the sloganofthe Occupy movement "They dontrepresent us!" to the demando fr ight-wing populist parties to let the people speak for themselves via direct-democratic procedures such as plebiscites,the principle of representation as af undamental element of democratic opinion-forming and participation is increasingly being questioned. More often than not, representation is either depicted as adistorting, patronizing,ormanipulating instrument in favor of the ruling classes and the political establishment or rejected entirely. According to this line of reasoning, instead of clinging to the idea of representation, politics should be giving more weight to the viewso ft he people and make sure that they are heard.
However, there seems to be aconsiderable difference between left-wing and right-wing political projects in this regard. Whileprogressive,emancipatory approaches (such as labor movements,a nti-colonials truggles,b lack liberation movements,women, gay and lesbian rights movements,orqueer activism)focus on how to give av oice to those who are excluded from the realm of political representation and find themselves especially vulnerable to violence,p overty, exploitation, and discrimination (such as women, people of color, subaltern subjects,p risoners, "illegal" migrants,o rr efugees), right-wing populist and extremista ctors try to short-circuit the representational process by claimingt hat they alone represent the "real people," usually defined as arighteous and morally pure entity. 1 In doing so,they increasingly appropriate traditionally leftist political strategies,a ppealingt ot he ideas of critique and emancipation, 2 and presenting themselvesa st he "real victims" of the liberal regime of "political correctness" and of a"falsetolerance" toward migrants and refugees. Former minorities,they claim, are now well on their way to becomingthe majority,thus threateningthe cultural identity of the autochthonous population. Examples of this kind of selfpresentationasthe "real victim" of liberal, humanitarian politics are rife.Think of white Americans maintaining that they are beingturnedinto aminority in their "own" country, the "Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident" (PEGIDA) in Germany,orthe alt-rightconspiracy theory about the "Great Replacement"-that is,the alleged plot of an organized exchange of the European population for Muslims by means of immigration and significantly higher birth rates.S uch claimsa re regularly accompanied not only by the assertion of an ethnically and culturally homogenous people but also by the call for authoritarian leadersand law-and-order politics.Toput it in anutshell:Right-wing populist and extremist parties are quite successful in portraying themselves as socially and politically silenced, while in fact dominating the public discoursew ith their political agendas.
In the light of the above,Iwill try to establish anormative criterionallowing us to distinguish between forms of speaking out and makingoneself heardthat we ought to support, and thosewemust reject. Against the widespread consensus that politics is above all about obtaining majorities,Iwill argue that when it comes to imagining emancipatory politics,w em ust also consider ap articular kind of becomingm inor. To do so,Iw ill, first, discuss Deleuze andF oucaultsc ritique of representation and its shortcomings.Iwill then make ad etourt oK afkasi ntriguing as wellasdisturbing story In the Penal Colony. This text is relevant for my approach on severalg rounds:E ven though it is prima facie as tory about guilt, punishment, and redemption, it is,o nc loser examination, also at ext on the complex workingsofrepresentation and the inevitability of speaking for and in the place of others.This becomes particularly clear in the ambivalent positionof the Europeantraveler who acts,inKafkastext, as arepresentativeofaliberal, humanitarian worldview,w hile turning away with unease from the ordinary peoplewhose languagehedoes not understand and whose desire for authoritarian rule he rejects.Furthermore,written around the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, the story describes af ragile situation of crisis and transition that shows certain similarities to our current globalized world in which the transnational exchange of information, goods,languages,and people goes hand in hand with the strengthening of national, religious,cultural, and ethnic fundamentalisms.Intheir study on Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari speak of acrisis that "accentuates everywhere movements of deterritorialization,and invites all sorts of complexreterritorialization -archaic,mythic,orsymbolist." 3 Today,this twofold movement of de-and reterritorialization is moste vident in the triumph of right-wing populist parties and far-right groups in Europe and the UnitedStates,with, on the one hand, their claim to cultural identity and racial, linguistic,a nd religious purity and, on the other hand, their emphasis on strict bordercontrols,anti-immigration laws,and national superiority.Referring to Deleuze and Guattarisconcept of "minor literatures" -aterm coined by Kafka-Iwill finally arguethat the task of becoming minor is not only an essentiale lement of any emancipatory politics but also enables us to differentiate between progressive and emancipatory forms of speaking out and their reactionary counterparts.
The Role of the Intellectuals
Thei ntellectualsa mbivalent relation to power is the focus of ac onversation between Foucault and Deleuze in March 1972 . Under the title "Intellectuals and Power,"F oucault and Deleuzed iscuss the role of the intellectual in political struggles in the aftermath of the May 1968 eventsi nF rance.R eferringt ot he Grouped Informations ur les Prisons,F oucault arguest hat the task of the intellectual is no longer to speak "the truth to those whoha [ve] yet to see it" or "in the name of those" who are unable to express it;rather, the challenge is "to create conditions that permit the prisoners themselves to speak."
4 What the events following 1968 and the subsequent formation of new political groupshave shownis "that the masses no longer need him [the intellectual] to gain knowledge:t hey know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far betterthan he,and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves"(IP,p.207). If thingsseem different, then this is because"there exists asystem of power which blocks,prohibits,and invalidates this discourse and this knowledge,apower not only foundi nt he manifest authority of censorship,but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an entire societalnetwork" (IP, p.207) .
In otherwords,the masses are perfectly capable of speaking for themselves and in their own name;therefore,intellectuals need to suppress the urge to function as representatives:"In my opinion,"Deleuze tells Foucault,"you were the first to teach us something absolutely fundamental:the indignity of speakingfor others" (IP,p.209). Here, Deleuze not only points to the violent and oppressive character of speaking for others but exposes what, in his view,isthe fundamental failure of the liberal model of representation. What is at stake is nothingless than aradical critique of every form of representation -b ei ta tt he linguistic, the epistemological, or the political level:"Representation no longer exists;theresonly action -theoretical action and practical action which serveasrelays,and form networks" (IP,pp. 206 f.).
To put it briefly,D eleuze demandst hat we drawt he practicala nd political conclusionsfrom the epistemological insight into the end of representation as the centralsystem of knowledge and classification:"We ridiculed representation and said it was finished, but we failed to draw the consequences of this theoretical conversion -toappreciate the theoretical fact that only those directly concerned can speak in apractical way on their own behalf" (IP, p.209) . What follows from this is ar adical shift in our conception of political change and transformation. While modest forms of political change merely modify the existing system of representation, the revolutionary practice breakse ntirely with representation. " [W] hen people begin to speak and act on their own behalf,they do not oppose their representation …toanother;they do not oppose anew representativityto the falser epresentativity of power" (IP,p .211);r ather, they put an end to representationassuch -asatheoretical and practical, and as an epistemological and political paradigm.
However, Deleuzesr ejection of representation and his juxtaposition of representationand revolution are by no means unproblematic. On the one hand, his 4M ichel Foucault /Gilles Deleuze,"Intellectuals and Power", in: Language,Counter-memory,Practice.Selected Essays &Interviews (Ithaca, NY,1992) , p. 206;hereafter abbreviated as IP.
anti-representational stancep resupposes that it is alwaysp ossible to speak for oneself, without any form of mediation or representation;onthe other hand, such aposition assumes the unmediated self-presence of apopular will just awaitingits articulation.Note also that Deleuzesdismissal of representation is not as clear as it may seem. When he rejects representation by arguing that "it is alwaysamultiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts," and that" all of us are groups[groupuscules]" (IP,p .206), one mightargue that representation has not completely disappeared, but rather has been transformed and modified:from an external relation between pre-established entities -such as the relation between a group and its spokesperson-to an ongoing process at the level of subject formation, whicha lso plays ac rucial role in the formationo fp olitical identities.
5
If this is the case,the problemisnot so much representation as such as an alltoo-simple notion of representation that negates and represses the constitutive role of representation in every act of speaking.T hus,a ccording to Bernhard Waldenfels,the issue is not so much that we speak for or in the place of others as that we never really speak in the place of the otherbut alwaysfrom our own place. Fori fe very speechi sa ddressed to someonea nd answers to am ode of being addressed, then it follows that in addressing and respondingw en ecessarily assume the place of those we addressand who address us."Thus,Eurocentrism -like every otherk ind of ethnocentrism -t urns out to be ar epressed form of representation." There is aneed to take acloser look at the complex workings of representation. This is all the more important as "the first step in the reversal of power and the initiation of new struggles againste xisting forms of power" is the struggle of namingand speaking out, as Foucault makesclear:"to speak on this subject, to force the institutionalized networks of information to listen, to produce names,to point the fingerofaccusation,tofind targets"(IP,p.214). This assertion,however, takes us back to the question of how this naming and speaking out might be possible for those who are systematically excluded from the realm of language and representation. How can those whose words are inaudible for us,o rr esemble more the speech of amadman than that of ahuman being, make themselves heard 5I nthis sense,Hardt and Negri are wrong when they,following Deleuze and Guattari, imagine The Impossibility and Inevitability of Representation Kafkas In the Penal Colony can be read as a" post-colonial" and "post-representational" text in various ways.Itnot only features apenal colony marked by moral declinea nd the deteriorationo fi ts legal and juridical system;w ritten in October 1914, only afew weeks afterthe outbreak of the First World War, and published in 1919, it also points to the ultimate failure of the imperial and colonial ambitions of the German Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy.R ight at the beginningofthe story,Kafka describes atypical colonialscenario. AEuropean traveler who visits apenal colonylocated in the tropics is invited"to attendthe execution of asoldier who had been condemned for disobedience and insulting behavior towards his superior" (PC,p.75). He is accompaniedbyanofficer who meticulously explains to him the mechanismo f" ar emarkable apparatus" designed by the deceased old commandant for the purpose of execution. Thecondemned man himself,w ho is guarded by as oldier,a ppears to fulfilla ll the ambivalent stereotypeso ft he colonized subject. He is both resistant and submissively devoted, both childishly naïve and perfidiously tricky: "a dull-witted, wide-mouthed being with unkempthair and awild expression,""astranger," not "a fellow-countryman and certainly not ap erson to arouseo nesc ompassion," who "lookedsosubmissiveand dog-like that it seemedasifone could let him run free on the hillsides, and would only have to whistle at the start of the execution for him to come" (PC,p.75). 8T his image of the condemned man is thwarted by his apparent will to knowledge, which follows an ostensive logic of gazes and gestures. Given the indifference of the soldier and the condemned man to the explanationsofthe officer-"for the officer spoke French, andcertainlyneitherthe soldier nor the condemned man understood French" -it is all the more striking "that nevertheless the condemnedman made every effort to follow the officersexplanations" (PC,p.77), thereby imitating and parodying the movements and gestures of the traveler. "With akind of somnolent persistence he keptturning his gaze wherevert he officer happened to be pointing,a nd now,a st he officer was interrupted by aq uestion from the traveller, like him, he too lookeda tt he traveller"( PC, p. 77). On parody and mimesis as colonial strategiesofresistance,see Stuart Hall, "The Spectacle of the Other", in: Representation. Cultural Representationsa nd Signifying Practices,ed. StuartHall (London, 1997). On acomprehensive "postcolonial" reading of Kafka see John Zilcosky, KafkasT ravels:E xoticism, Colonialism,a nd the Traffic of Writing (New York, 2004) .
At the same time,Kafkas In the Penal Colony impressivelyunfolds the complex workingsofrepresentation, delegation, and speaking for others. Not only is the officer the "solerepresentative [Vertreter]" of the long-established execution procedureand "at the same time the sole representative of the old Commandants legacy" (PC,p .86), 9 for which he tries to win the traveler as an advocate and intercessor;healso stands and speaks for an apparently both archaic and modern version of punishment, speech, and writing that seemstoanticipate not only the technological possibilitieso fm emory,a rchive, and reproduction but alsot he technological machineries of the extermination camps of the 20 th century.T he troubles of representation and speakingfor others are also reflected in the person of the traveler. Although "travelling simply as an observer and not with the smallest intention of changing the legal constitution of af oreign country" (PC, p. 86), he seemingly never speaks for himself.Heacts not only as arepresentative and envoy of Europe and the project of enlightenmentbut also -whether he likes it or not -asarepresentative,delegate,and intercessorofthe condemned man, the soldier,the officer, and the commandant.
In short, the traveler embodies,a si tw ere, the scandal of representation,o f speaking and acting for others, which is just as impossible as it is inevitable.F or him, there is no neutral position;his speaking is always already -beitinthe most banal remark:" yes,Iobserved the execution",o r" yes,Iheard all the explanations" (PC,p .91) -aperformative act of judgment. Without actually speaking,hespeaks for the condemned man;hejudges and condemns (the officer) withoutbeing appointed as ajudge;and yet at the sametime he evades his responsibility by finally fleeing the island.
Them ain focus of interest in Kafkass tory is "a remarkable apparatus" (ein eigentümlicher Apparat). What makes this apparatusremarkable is the fact that it does not simply kill the convict, who does not know the sentence that has been imposed on him, but rather inscribes the sentencewith fine needles upon his body in at welve-hourp rocedure until death occurs.T hus,t he act of inscription is at once the announcement and the execution of the judgment. This also means, however, that the act of inscriptionisagenuine act of communication;and as in every act of communication, "malfunctions do occur,"asthe officerhas to concede.H owever,t hese malfunctionsc an -i nc ontrast to the many pitfalls of everyday communication -be"put right straight away" (PC,p.76). In short, what makes the apparatussoremarkable (eigentümlich), peculiar, and worthy of being noticedand remembered, is its ability to fabricate ascript and to create amemory. Here,itisimportant that we bear in mindthe ambivalent meanings of the German eigentümlich. For eigentümlich (deriving from Eigentum,"property") signifiesnot only "belonging exclusively (to),""proper (to),""characteristic (of),""inherent (to),"a nd "specific (to)" but also "peculiar," "singular,"" strange," "queer,"
9T he English editionm isleadingly translates the German "Vertreter" as "champion".
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TheT ask of Becoming Minor:Onthe PoliticsofRepresentation Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 "odd,"t hus comprising both what is oneso wn and its apparento pposite.A ccordingly,the German eigentümlich evades the opposition between the own and the foreign, the knownand the unknown, the properand the improper.Indeed, it seems to dwell in the very undecidability of these oppositions.
Thus,t ob e" in the penal colony" -e ither as as oldier, officer, or travelermeans above alltobeexiled from home,from that whichexclusively belongs to us and seems typicalofus, from our own native language, so that, strangely enough, the all-too-heavy uniforms in Kafkasstorycome to represent that which we do not want to lose contact with:"Surely theseuniforms are too heavy for the tropics [Tropen] ,said the traveller, instead of enquiringafter the apparatus as the officer had expected. Indeed, said the officer, washing handsdirty from oil and grease in aw aiting bucket of water, but they mean home;w ed ontw ant to lose contact with our home country."(PC,p.75) What becomes apparenthere is not only the alienating and proliferatingp ower of the tropics the colonizer feels entitled to controla nd dominate but also the disseminative force of rhetorical tropes.I ti s certainly no coincidence that the German Tropen means both "tropes" and "tropics." In this sense,the penal colonyisnot only atropical island but also an "island of tropes," 10 aplace where no proper, literal language seems to exist, and where the persuasive power of rhetoric undermines any clear and distinct meaning and usurps every act of communication.
Indeed, all terms,figures,and personae seem to be inscribed into Kafkastext in at wofold sense. At first sight, the officer and the traveler belong to two differente pistemic systems and regimes, thus representing two conflicting worldviews:One is "the liberal, humanitarian outlook of the European traveler;" the other is "the officersf anatical, quasi-religious dedication to the torture-machine."
11 Put differently,weare confronted with the opposition betweenOccident and Orient, betweenreasonand barbarism, or, as Foucault puts it, between, on the one hand, the "universal communicationofknowledge and the infinite free exchange of discourses in Europe" and, on the other hand, "the monopolised and secret knowledge of Oriental tyranny."
12
At as econd glance,h owever, it becomes obvious thatt he traveler and the officer share at leastacommon language. It is their discourse alone, the "vehicular, urban, governmental language" of the colonizer, 13 that becomes loud and audible; and only the two of them are able to switchbetween the different codes, languages,and systems.T hus,welearn that the languageinwhich they communicate is French, although it is probablyn either the officersn or the travelers native language. It is,rather, the dominant governmental language they mutually come to accept as lingua franca,which in turn is understood neither by the soldier nor by the condemned man (see PC,p .77). Notea lso that their conversation encompasses the whole range of linguistic modes of expression, from eloquent silence to whispering to shouting, while the vernacular, territorial, regional language of the soldier and the condemned man remains an indeterminate muttering or soundless giggling,interruptedonly once by the two mensloud laughter, which immediatelyt urns into a"silent laughter" (PC,p .96). In other words,a lthough the soldier and the condemnedman are constantly speaking with each other, none of theirw ords are audible for us or become effective.W ithint he hegemonic system of representation, their words are "considered null and void,"asFoucault puts it with regardtothe division of reasonand madness, "having neithertruth nor importance,worthless as evidence in law,inadmissible in the authentification of deeds or contracts."
14

Insurrectionary Speech Acts
Against this background, those rare moments in which the condemnedman and the soldier dare to speak out become even more important. At first,this happens as aa na bsurd-comical and brutish act of resistance by the condemned man towardshis superior:"Throw your whip away, or Ill eat you up [Wirf die Peitsche weg,oder ichfresse dich]"(PC,p.80);and then it happens again when the soldier, after the acquittal of the condemned man and the self-execution of the officer, addresses the traveler in an explanatory mannerconcerningthe grave of the old commandant:"Heresthe teahouse.…TheOld Man is buried here" (PC,p.98). Without doubt, it is the "impossible"i nsurrectionary speech act of the condemnedman that is of particular interest here.When the officer states the principle of all his judicialsentences and decisions -"Guilt is always beyond doubt [Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos]" (PC,p .80) -h ee xpresses the ultimately unrealizable desire that there should never be any doubt -n either in the act of speaking nor in language itself.S peech is presented here as aq uasi-divine performative act of asinglevoice that produces what it designates."Other courts are unable to followt his principle," the officer declares," for they are made up of many persons" and are therefore ambivalent and "also subjectt ocourts higher than themselves" (PC,p.80). However,since no worldly court and no languagelanguage of businesses,commercial exchange,bureaucratic transmission,"see Deleuze/ Guattari, Kafka:T owardaMinor Literature,p.23. 14 Foucault, "The Order of Discourse", p. 53.
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juridical or other -can ever fulfill this condition,speech and guilt are,from the start, intrinsically linkedtoeach other.Inother words,weare guilty as soon as we speak. Thus,the violationofduty of which the condemned man is guiltyisless that he failed to do his service by falling asleep in front of the door of his superior than that he speaks, that he uses language in aw ay he is neither legitimized nor authorized to:" Instead of getting up and begging forgiveness,t he man seizedh is master round the legs,shook him, and shouted: Throw your whip away,orIll eat you up"(PC,p.80).
This speech act is disturbingi natwofold sense:I nstead of beggingf or forgiveness,which would have been the adequate and appropriate reaction,the act encompasses ar ebelliousi mperative ("Throw your whip away") as well as an impossible threat ("Ill eat you up").O nt he one hand, the speecha ct of the condemnedm an is an act of resistance,s uspending the logic and force of the military orderatleast for ashort moment; on the otherhand, it can be understood as an affirmative act of self-appropriationt hrough which the condemnedm an assumes and resignifies the doglike position that is assigned to him by his superior. Thus,his impossible or catachresticspeech act undermines not only the relations of authority and power but also the limits between the serious and the non-serious as well as the human and the non-human.
What is unacceptable for the officer is not so much the disobedience of the soldier as theambiguity and uncontrollability of discourse,the constant sliding of the chain of signifiers and the withdrawal of meaning in an open-ended process of substitutions.W ithout doubt, the languageo ft he penal colony is al anguage of tropes,falsehood, delusion, and masquerade,but the real problem is not so much the possibility of falsehood as itsi nterminability:t he substitution of one lie for another, and so on indefinitely:"Only confusionwould arise," the officerjustifies his course of action, "if Ihad summoned the man and interrogated him first. He would have lied, and if Ihad succeeded in refuting his lies,hewould have replaced them with fresh lies,and so on. But now Ive got him, and Ishantlet him go.-Does that explain everything?"( PC,p .80) Of course it does not. But this is a rhetorical question, and the officer is not looking for an answer. Foraccording to his deadly logic,t he aim and end of punishment, as it were,i st op ut an end to language and speech itself,establishing an absolute and unconditional discourse that does not allow for any answer, contradiction,o rt alking back. Such ad iscourse would no longer be speech but writing -af orm of writing that directly inscribes itself upon the body,withoutany mediation of the ear or the voice of the other.Therefore,according to the officer, it would be pointlessand useless if not unlawful, to tell the condemned man his judgment, instead of hearing or reading it, "[h]e will feel it in his own flesh" (PC,p.79).
However, and quite surprisingly,the very script in which the sentence "Honour thy superior!" is inscribed upon the body of the condemned man is not easy to decipher:"Read it, said the officer. Icant, said the traveller. But itsperfectly clear, said the officer. Itsvery elaborate, said the traveller evasively, but Icant decipher it. Yes, said the officer with al augh, putting the case back into his pocket, itsnot ascriptfor schoolchildrenscopy-books.One has to read it over a long period.Y ou would certainly be abletomake it out for yourself in the end." (PC,pp. 82 f.)T he reason for the illegibility of the scriptisthat it has been decorated and embellished beyond recognition in order to prolong the execution. While the "real,""actual,"or"proper" script (eigentliche Schrift)would kill the convict immediately, its excessive rhetorical embellishment makes possible a deciphering with closed eyes: "Of courseitshouldntbeasimple script; afterall, itsnot supposed to kill immediately,but only within aspace of twelve hours on average; the turning-point has been calculated to come at the sixth hour. So the actual script [eigentliche Schrift]has to be surrounded by many,many flourishes; the real script [wirklicheSchrift]encircles the body only in anarrowgirdle;the rest of the body is intended for decoration." (PC, p.83) In other words,b ecause of the manyr hetorical flourishes,t he procedure is prolonged to such an extent that the sentence inscribes itself not only upon the body but also upon the mindofthe condemned man, with its tropic-tropological turning point occurring aroundthe sixth hour. According to this paradoxical logic, it is precisely the temporal deferral caused by the rhetoricity of the script that is the condition of possibility for deciphering its actual, propermeaning and, thus, forg aining knowledge and salvation without any mediation. "Indeed, nothing further happens;the man simply begins to decipher the script;hepurses his lips as if he were listening. Youhave seen it is not easy to decipher the script with ones eyes;but our man deciphersthem with his wounds.Admittedly,itishard work. He needs six hours to accomplish it."(PC,p.84) Thus,t he ultimate promise of the remarkable apparatus is that it might be possible to communicate directly through the materiality of the script and the body.T his bodily script would notb eaderived,s econdary,o rp erverted form of human speech;r ather,a sa"sign languageo ft he stronger," it would be its most fundamental form. 15 Not surprisingly,K afkasw riting apparatus recalls Nietzschescruel mnemotechnics,which is necessary to create amemory for the humananimal and to breed an animal with the right to make promises.Just as the sentence inscribes itself upon the body of the convict, until he recognizes and misrecognizes it as his own," [m]anc ould never do withoutb lood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create amemory for himself."
16 But while in Nietzsche this cruel and violentprocess ends with the sovereign individual, "the man who has his own independent protracted will and the righttomakepromises," 17 in Kafka we are confronted with athreefold speechlessness: the dullness of the "poor,downtrodden people" awaiting the resurrection of the old commandant and his authoritarian regime;the submissiveness of the soldier and the condemned man runningbehind the traveler "in silence, for they dared not shout out" (PC,p .99);a nd the apathyo ft he traveler who evades any kind of involvement by fleeing the island.
If we now return to the distinction between reformist and revolutionary politics as suggested by Foucault and Deleuze, the condemned man can be construed, prima facie,asthe man of action and revolution, while the soldier seems to arrange himself mimetically with the dominant regime of representation. But neitherthe soldiersm imesis nor the condemned mansc atachresis are ultimately successful. 18 While the condemned remains silent despite his verdict of acquittal, the speech of the soldier lacks force and power:h er eports and describes, but he cannot produce or transform asituation. In the end, both are left behind in silence on the tropic-tropological island, without alanguage of their own. Theonly language they understand is,s oi ts eems,aviolent sign language of injuries.I t therefore makes perfects ense that the travelerss ilent threat with a" heavily knottedr ope" suffices to prevent them from following him, even though they would "still have been able to leap into the boat" (PC,p.99). In other words,the soldier and thecondemned man have to acknowledge not the physicalsuperiority of the traveler, but that they do not have a"proper" language to show the "signs of equality."
19
This situation recallsHerodotus tale of the Scythian slave revolt as adopted by Jacques Rancire to illustrate the foundations of politics.After the Scythians fail to crush the uprising of their former slavesbyforce of arms,they lay theirweapons aside and approachthem equippedonly with their horsewhips.Struckbythis sea change,the slaves throw their arms awayand flee without fight. Thus,all that is necessary for the Scythians to defeat theirs laves is to "show the signso ft heir difference in nature;" for,what the slaves "cannot do is transform equality in war into political freedom." 20 Thesame holds true for the soldier and the condemned man. Of course,they speak in their vernacular, territorial, regionallanguage,but their wordsr emain either unheard or without effect. Neither in the repressive system of the penal colonynor in the liberal, humanitarian system of the European traveler can their interests and rights be asserted;a nd an ew system is currently not in sight. We could even go astep further and say that it is solidarity as such that cannot be expressed, since there is no language in which it canbeaudibly articulated, 21 an aspect that is alsoreflected in the helplessness and apathy of the traveler.
This seemingly aporetic situation also appears in the unsatisfyinge nding of Kafkasstory.OrasKafka puts it:"Tw oorthree of the final pages are botched, and their presence points to some deeper flaw [Mangel] ; there is aworm somewhere which hollows out the story,d ense as it is." 22 However, this flaw or insufficiencyisperhapsnot so much aflaw as an essentialelement of Kafkastext in particular and of language in general. Fori tc an be argued that withoutt his insufficiency every meaning would be alreadyf ixed, every interpretation determined in advance,and every act of speaking up made impossible from the start. Thus,a so utlined above,t here would be no speech at all, but only the mere exchange of commands and injuries.Inthe final analysis,this means that Kafkas In theP enal Colony is atext not only about the impossibility and inevitability of representation and speaking for others but also about the impossibility of an "own," "proper" language that could be fully controlled and mastered by us.
From Literature to Politics
One way to deal with this aporetic situation is to think of Kafkast ext as a paradigmatic example of a" minor literature," ac oncept he outlines in ad iary entry from 25 December 1911, and whichisidiosyncratically adoptedbyDeleuze and Guattari in theirstudy Kafka: TowardaMinor Literature (1975 
295
TheT ask of Becoming Minor:Onthe PoliticsofRepresentation
Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 to Deleuze and Guattari, aminor literature -orrather"minor literatures"(Kafka deliberately uses the word in the plural, "kleineLiteraturen") -isnot simply the literature of alinguistic minority but the literature "which aminority constructs within amajor language." 24 An example of such aminor language was the German spokenb yt he Jews of Prague in the Austrian empire,w hile Czech itself was a minor languagei nr elationt oG erman;" and Kafka, aC zechoslovakian Jew writing in German, submits German to creative treatment as aminor language." 25 This also means that the opposition between minority and majority is not just a question of numbers, 26 as wellasthat there is no minorlanguage as such:Aminor language always only exists in relation to amajor language that itself can become a minor language. (Franz Kafka, The Diaries:1910 -1923 (New York, 1948 25 Gilles Deleuze /F é lix Guattari, AT housand Plateaus:C apitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis, 1987), p. 104. This double diaspora made the writing of the Prague Jews impossible in all respects.K afka himself even speaks of three "linguistic impossibilities" that afflicted the writing of the Prague Jews:" Thei mpossibility of not writing, thei mpossibility of writing German, the impossibility of writingd ifferently" (Kafka, Letters to Friends,Family,and Editors,Letter to Max Brod, June 1921) . Or in the words of Deleuze and Guattari:First, "the impossibility of notwriting because national consciousness…necessarily exists by means of literature;" second,"the impossibility of writing in German,"insofarastheir German was aminority language detached from its homeland (even though it wast he language of ad ominantm inority," an oppressive minority that speaks al anguage cut off from the masses,l ike a paper language or an artificial language");a nd finally,t he impossibility of writing otherwise," writing other than in German,"because they felt "an irreducible distance from their primitive Czech territoriality" (K,p.16). In this context, Casanovaunderlines the significanceofKafkas discovery of "Yiddishkeit" at the end of 1911 through the Polish theater actor Yitzchak Lowy (Casanova, The World Republic of Letters, . 26 See Deleuze /Guattari, AThousand Plateaus,p.105:"Majorityimplies aconstant, of expression or content, serving as astandard measure by whichtoevaluateit. Let us suppose that the constant or standard is the average adult-white-heterosexual-Europeanmale-speakingastandard language.…It is obvious that man holds the majority,even if he is less numerous than mosquitoes,c hildren, women, blacks,p easants,h omosexuals, etc." Subsequently, Deleuze and Guattari differentiate three maincharacteristics of minor literatures:First, in minor literatures language is deterritorialized,which is to say that language is detached from its supposed home countryand subjected to aseries of displacements and relocations;s econd, "everything in them is political," because in minor literature "its cramped space forces each individual intrigue to connect immediately to politics;"a nd third, in minor literatures" everything takes on a collective value," insofar as "what each author says individually alreadyconstitutes acommon action, and what he or she says or does is necessarily political, even if others arentinagreement" (K,p .17, my emphasis).
27 Accordingly,minor literatures are literatures that deterritorialize language, that connect the individual directly to the political, and that -w ithouta ssuming the selfpresence of aspeaking subject -produce"collective assemblages of enunciation" and "an active solidarity in spite of skepticism" (K,pp. 17 f.). Understood in this way,t he adjective" minor,"a sD eleuze and Guattari argue,n ol onger qualifies "specific literatures but the revolutionaryc onditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great( or established) literature" (K,p .18). Consequently,t he task of writing, as understood by Kafka, is precisely the task of "becoming-minor;" it is to "make use of the polylingualismo fo neso wn language,tomake aminor or intensive use of it" (K,pp. 27 f.).
This bringsm eb ack to my initial question concerning the problem of representation and the ambivalent role of the intellectual within political struggles.For it can be argued that the task of becoming minor appliesnot only to literature but also,m ore generally, to the realm of the political. As we have seen, however, Foucault and Deleuze denounce any kind of speaking for othersa sp atronizing and degrading. Since the people can speakperfectly well for themselves,asthey claim,itisrather amatter of creating the necessary conditionsfor this speakingby fighting the "system of power which blocks, prohibits,a nd invalidates this discourse and this knowledge" (IP, p .207) . 28 In the final analysis,t his means,a ccordingtoDeleuze,that we have to abandon representation as such and, instead, favor aconcept of theoretical and practical action.
As has been shown, this account turns out to be highlyproblematic for several reasons:F irst, it presupposesthe existence of apopularwill that can be directly articulated;s econd, the people or the masses are imagined as ah omogeneous, unifiede ntityw ithout ruptures and faults;a nd third, immediacy is viewed as a value in its own right, to the effect that what is directly articulated is considered 27 See also Kafkasphrasethat "literature is less aconcern of literary history than of the people" (Kafka, The Diaries:1910 -1923 ,December 25, 1911 , which, of course,does not mean that it represents the people. 28 Consequently, the "intellectualsrole is no longer to place himself somewhat ahead and to the side in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity;r ather,i ti st o struggle against theformsofpower that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of knowledge,truth,consciousness, and discourse"(IP,pp. 207 f.). legitimate per se. Such aconception comes dangerously closetocurrent emerging right-wing populist movements in Europe and the United States,which declare liberalintellectuals,the political establishment, and the censorship by the liberal regime of "political correctness" theirenemies.
In contrast,Ihave argued that we cannot escape the processofrepresentation. We always already represent others -whetherwelike it or not. Thus,the problem is not representation as such but rather its repression -e ither by rejecting the inevitability of representation and the concomitant responsibility it imposes on us (this is what the traveler does in Kafkas In the Penal Colony by fleeing the island) or by assuming adiscourse or aknowledge that appears as soon as it is freed from the oppressive powerofcensorship (this is what Deleuze and Foucault suggest). If, however, it is true that we alwaysa lready speak on behalf and in the place of others and that we do not have at our disposal aneutral, quasi-universal language that would allow us to switchb etween different codes,i diolects,a nd languages withoutpatronizing or silencing others,then it becomes crucial to make aminor or polylingual use of our language,e ven if or precisely because" it is am ajor language or has been."According to Deleuze and Guattari, this means that we must strive "to oppose the oppressed qualityofthis languagetoits oppressive quality,to find points of nonculture or underdevelopment, linguisticThird World zones by which alanguage can escape." In other words,what is at stake is the "possibility of makingof[ones] own language …aminorutilization" and to become"asort of stranger within [ones] own language" (K,p p. 26 f.), 29 while at the samet ime resisting the phantasmagoric desire for reterritorialization (archaic, symbolic, religious,etc.) -asexemplified by the messianic prophecyatthe end of Kafkas story that promises its faithful followers the resurrection of the old commandant and the recapture of the colony.
Toward aBecoming-Minor
Against this background it now becomes clear that the concept of becomingminor is not only directed against essentialistideas of cultural identity and purity but also provides us with an ormatively significant criterionf or differentiating between emancipatory forms of speaking out and making oneself heard and their reactionary and reterritorializing counterparts.P rogressive,e mancipatory approaches seek to extend the realm of the visible and hearablefor those who are 29 Note thatBenjamin -quoting Pannwitz -argues in his famous essay "The Task of the Tr anslator"t hat the "basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully affectedbythe foreign tongue.…He must expandand deepenhis language by means of the foreign language" (Walter Benjamin, "The Task of the Tr anslator", in: Selected Writings.V olume 1: 1913 -1926 (Cambridge,Mass., 1996 especially vulnerable to violence and discrimination -n ot by simply expanding the scope of language,but by making aminor use of language, therebyexposing a strangenessand vulnerability inherentnot only in each individual language but in language itself.I nc ontrast to this,r ight-wing populist,a lt-right, and far-right groups-despite their differencesand occasionaldisagreements -ultimately share the sameobjective:"to assume amajorfunction in language, to offer themselves as asort of state language,anofficial language" (K,p.27) . This attempt to assume at all costs amajor function in language is nothing more than the self-destructive desire for alanguage in which every meaningisunequivocal and every statement instantaneously becomes law,withoutany mediation or representation-like the judgment In the Penal Colony,w hich is experienced even with closed eyes,b ecause all know:"now Justice is being done" (PC,p.87).
Thed isturbing ending of Kafkass tory makes strikingly clear where such a desire ultimatelyl eads to -n amely, to the self-destruction of the remarkable apparatus and its "sole representative," the officer. Thew ell-known statement "A merica First,"which undermines its claim to superiority as soon as it is asserted (otherwise,t here would be no need to state it at all), is just one prominent variation of this desire.Itisadesire that is usually accompaniedbythe aspiration to become invulnerable,which, because it can never be realized, in turn leads to an excessive heightening of the vulnerability of others.Bearing this in mind,wecan see that the notorious claim of right-wing populists and extremists to freedom of speech and the "courage of the truth," 30 along with the claim that they alone are the mouthpiece of the "real people,"isnot meanttogive avoice to the people,let alone to those whoare especially exposedtov iolence,d isenfranchisement, and discrimination, but rather to totalize speech and language itself by short-circuiting the work of representation and translation.
Contrary to this desire for putting an end to representation as such and for assuming amajor functioninlanguage,emancipatory politics must stress the task of becoming-minor. Here,according to Deleuze and Guattari, "becoming-minor" does not mean that we should seek to become am inority or join an already existingminority in agiven society -for example,women,black people,Jews,etc. What is at stake is,r ather, ab ecoming-minor that also affects the so-called "majority:" abecoming-woman that also affects non-women, abecoming-black that also affects people who are not black, etc. Thes ame applies to minor languages:they are not simply sublanguages,idiolects,ordialectsbut the becomingeffective of am inor use of am ajor language that in turn affects the entire language. 31 In fact,todwellinalanguage that is not onesown is not just aproblem of 
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Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 minorities,especially immigrants and their children, "but also aproblem for all of us:h ow to tear am inor literature awayf rom its own language,a llowing it to challenge the language and making it follow as ober revolutionary path?" (K, p. 19) . Surprisingly,h owever, Deleuze and Guattari locate the political potential of such abecoming-minor not so much in insurrectionary or political speech acts as in the literary works of authors "termed minor, who are in fact the greatest, the only greats." 32 Thus,ifwedonot want to lose the political significanceofDeleuze and Guattarisconcept of becoming-minor, we also have to thinkofthoseforms of speaking up and making oneself heard that explicitlytake place in the domainof the political. Possible exampleso fs uch am inor use of political language and speech are the public intonation of the American national antheminSpanish by "illegal" immigrants in the United Statesorthe use of the "human microphone" during the Occupy protests. 33 In the first case,illegal immigrants,who do not have apolitically audible voice,make aminor use of the dominant language not only by intoning the American national anthem in Spanish but also by problematizing the "We" of the nation as aplurality that needs to be renegotiated. 34 In the second case,the task of becoming minor manifests itself in the productive performative contradictionthat the joint practiceofthe "humanmicrophone" both performs and names when the "I" of the speaker is echoed and amplified by the multitude of the crowd. 35 What becomesapparenthere -besides the split between the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement -a re not only the bodily and material conditionsofspeech that constitute every speech act as abodily act but also the fact that my speech is only my speech insofar as it is always already the speech of everybodyelse.Thus,the echo of the multitude exposes,asitwere,the split of the subject. Or to put this point in Lacanian terms:"language comes from the Other, and the idea that I am master of my discourse is only an illusion."
36
These examples also highlight that thetask of becomingminor does not necessarilye ntail am icro-politics that is limited to particularistic power struggles. According to Oliver Marchart, such amicro-politicswould be no politics at all, for "in order to be reasonably describable as political, ap articular project has to possess the tendency [to] becoming-major,even if it will never be able to achieve the status of full universality ….An agent whoaims for the opposite,meaning a particularistic projecto fs elf-minorisation, and eventuallyo fs elf-ghettoisation, would effect astandstill in the movement towards universality and thereby induce the projectsresignation from politics."
37
Even thoughIlargely concur with this description, it is not an objectiontothe task of becoming minor. In fact, Iwant to argue that becoming minor,f ar from being aminority politicso ra"particularisticp roject of self-minorisation,"isan essential elemento fa ny emancipatory project of political subjectivation, coalition building, and collective political agency. Foritisonly by makingaminor use of oneslanguage that aclaim to universality can be articulated withoutpatronizing and colonizing others.Inother words,the tendency of becoming major as a necessary moment of politics must, at the same time,besupplementd by the task of becoming minor, and vice versa. 38 This also resonates with Judith Butlers notion of culturalt ranslation,asproposed in her exchange with Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Ž ižek. According to Butler, cultural translation does not mean the transfer of as pecific concept of universality between different cultures,a st his JournalofOntology,History andCritics 7/1-2 (2016): 1-13. The human microphone is a practice adopted by the Occupy movement after the New York City Council prohibited the use of microphones and soundsystems in ZuccottiPark. Each sentence of the speaker is repeated and echoedb yt he whole group,w hile the participants of the assembly accompany the speech with bodily gestures to express and articulate consent, dissent, their wish to speak, etc. 36 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London/ New York, 1996), p. 55. 37 Oliver Marchart, Thinking Antagonism:P olitical Ontology After Laclau (Edinburgh,2018, p. 136);see also Oliver Marchart, Die politische Differenz. Zum Denkendes Politischen bei Nancy,L efort, Badiou, Laclau und Agamben (Berlin, 2010), pp.301 f. 38 In asimilar vein, Ž ižek argues that "each particular position, in order to articulate itself,involves the (implicit or explicit) assertion of its own mode of universality," while,in turn, universality is always already contaminatedb yt he particular and constituted by implicit exclusions.See Judith Butler /Ernesto Laclau /Slavoj Ž ižek, Contingency,Hegemony,Universality:ContemporaryDialogues on the Left (London, 2000) , p. 315.
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TheT ask of Becoming Minor:Onthe PoliticsofRepresentation Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 would amount to the "use of the doctrine of universality in the service of colonialism and imperialism." 39 Rather, cultural translation ought to be understood as the continuous "labour of transaction and translation which belongs to no single site,but is the movement between languages,and has its final destination in this movement itself." 40 However, and in addition to,Butlersaccount of cultural translation,the task of becoming minor, as proposed here, is not simply amovementbetween languages that has its final end in the movement itself.Rather, it is amovement or becoming that affects all languages involved. Furthermore,itisimportant to understand that no language,however minor, is immune to the tendencytobecome major, which, of course,does not relieve us fromthe necessity to counter this tendency. 41 Va rious kinds of deterritorializations, as we experience them in the current era of globalization, tendtoengender new forms of ethnic,religious,nationalist, or cultural reterritorializations.This is apparent in the sweeping electoral successofpopulist movements in Europe and the United States, the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, or the re-emergence of nationalism and independence efforts within the European Union. Consequently,t he task of becomingm inor, of making a minoruse of language,isneither an achievablegoal nor an end in itself,but rather acontinuous reworking of languagesuch that solidarity can be articulated.
As aresult, we have to differentiate between, first,p articularistic projects of self-minorization that cannot reasonably be called "political"; second, the tendency of becoming major by putting an end to language and speech -and, thus,to politics -itself;and, third, the task of becomingminor by makingaminor use of language,even if -orprecisely because -itisamajor language or has been. This distinctionisimportant. Forifthe only condition of politics were the tendency of becoming major,then there would be no way to differentiate between, on the one hand, progressive,e mancipatory political projects and, on the other hand, nationalistic, racist, and xenophobic ambitions.I f, however, we acceptt he proposition that becoming minor is anecessary prerequisite for any emancipatory politicalproject,wemight gain acriterion for evaluating different forms of speaking up and making oneselfheard -even though the task of becomingminor cannot, by 39 Butler /Laclau /Žižek, Contingency,Hegemony,Universality,p .15. 40 Butler /Laclau /Žižek, Contingency,Hegemony,Universality,p .179. 41 Right-wing groups, presenting themselvesa st he sole advocates of free speech, usually reject, inter alia,guidelines for agender-neutral language with the argument that such guidelines would impose aliberal regime of "political correctness." This argument deliberately ignorest hat the spoken dominant or "official" language systematically silences largep arts of the population;think, for example,o ft he use of the generic masculinumi nG erman or the term "man" in English, which signifies both the species in generaland amale person. In this sense,guidelinesfor agender-neutral language are,toa certain extent, an attempt to "institutionalize"abecoming-minor that, at thesame time, must resist the tendency to become majorbypermanently reflecting on its own workings. definition,assume the form of apolitical program or agenda. Thus,what is needed for ar enewed political Lefta re not only new political alliances, strategies,a nd agendas -though they are,ofcourse,essentialtoany reasonable politicalprojectbut also apolitical language -ofbothpolitical theory and political action -that makes aminor use of itself. 42 
